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The Specific Plan in California:
A Developing Concept for the Resolution
Of Conflicts in Land Use
LINDELL L. MARSH* and
BRUCE G. MERRITT**
I. THE PROBLEM: EXCESSIVE URBANIZATION
Excessive urbanization has diminished the quality of life in
much of California, particularly along its coast. Communities
have been destroyed by their merger into expanding megalopolises.
The pollution of the State's air and waters has increased. Popula-
tion and structural density has reduced the amount of open space
lands available for agriculture, outdoor recreation and wildlife.
At the urging of their constituencies, government agencies on all
levels have attempted to formulate innovative strategies and to
adapt traditional forms of regulation to deal with this threat. An
increasing number of local communities have devised regulatory
schemes to limit or control growth in population and structural
density.1 Programs have been implemented to address these prob-
*A.B., U.C.L.A.; L.L.B., Hastings College of Law; member of the law
firm of Nossaman, Waters, Krueger & Marsh; lecturer at U.S.C. Graduate
School of Planning and Urban Studies.
**A.B., Occidental College; J.D., Harvard Law School; associate with
the-law firm of Nossaman, Waters, Krueger & Marsh.
1. See, e.g., Irvine, Cal. § 12 Urgency Interim Ordinance, December 18,
1973.
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lems on a regional level in the San Francisco Bay area,2 Lake
Tahoe3 and along the California coast generally.4 State legislation
has been enacted to promote the conservation of open space lands
for agriculture and other purposes.5 State and federal regulations
controlling air and water quality and noise have been promulgated
in recent years and have had their effect on land use policy. The
preservation of wildlife areas and the public's right of access to the
coast have been enhanced by recent state legislation and landmark
court decisions.6 Even broader land use legislation has been pro-
2. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66600 et seq. (West 1966) (establishing the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission). See generally
Note, Saving San Francisco Bay: A Case Study in Environmental Legisla-
tion, 23 STAN. L. REV. 349 (1971).
3. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66800 et seq. (West Supp. 1966). Comment, Re-
gional Government for Lake Tahoe, 22 HAST. L.J. 705 (1971). See also
Muys, Interstate Compacts and Water Resources Planning and Management,
4 NATURAL RES. L. 153 (1973).
4. The California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972, CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976), establishes the California
Coastal Zone Conservation Commission and authorizes the preparation of
the California Coastal Plan. See Note, Saving the Seashore: Management
Planning for the Coastal Zone, 25 HAST. L. J. 191 (1973); Jackson & Baum,
Regional Planning: The Coastal Zone Initiative Analyzed in Light of the
BCDC Experience, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 426 (1972). See also CAL. PUs. RES.
CODE §§ 22000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976) (establishing the Ventura-Los
Angeles Mountain and Coastal Study Commission).
5. E.g., the California Land Conservation Act of 1965, CAL. GOV'T CODE§§ 51200 et seq. (West 1966); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 402.1 and 421-25
(West Supp. 1976) (with respect to the taxation of agricultural and open-
space lands); and the Open-Space Lands Act of 1970, CAL. GOV'T CODE §§
65560 et seq. (West Supp. 1976). See also ECKBO, DEAN, AUSTIN &
WILLIAMS, STATE OPEN SPACE AND RESOURCE CONSERVATION PROGRAM FOR
CALIFORNIA, prepared for the California Legislature Joint Committee on
Open Space Land (1972); CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, JOINT COMMITTEE ON
OPEN SPACE LAND, FINAL REPORT (1970); ASSEMBLY SELECT COMMITTEE ON
OPEN SPACE LANDS, CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE, OPEN SPACE ZONING HAND-
BOOK (1973); A.B. 15 (Warren) 1974-1975 Reg. Sess. (regarding the preser-
vation of agricultural lands).
6. See e.g., Gion v. City of Santa Cruz, 2 Cal. 3d 29, 465 P.2d 50, 84
Cal. Rptr. 162 (1970) (implying dedication of public rights of way by
waterfront property owners). But see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1009 (f) (West Supp.
1976) (modifying the effect of the Gion rule); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d
251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971) (restricting the filling of tide-
lands); CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66478.1 et seq. (West Supp. 1976) (requiring
dedication of public access to waterways as a condition for the approval
of a subdivision map); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66474 (West Supp. 1976) (requir-
ing that approval of a subdivision be withheld in cases where substantial
and avoidable injury to fish or wildlife is likely); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12606
posed at both the state and federal levels.7
Finding effective solutions to the problems of excessive urbani-
zation is not a simple task. The solutions offered are frequently
viewed as contrary to our basic concepts of private property, equal
protection of the laws and due process, as well as to the accepted
traditional relationships between federal, state and local govern-
ments. In addition, the solutions proposed often conflict with
policies relating to other seemingly important social objectives such
as the continued availability of reasonably priced energy and the
well-being of the nation's economy. The recent controversy re-
garding the leasing of federal lands off the southern California
coast for petroleum production brought to the forefront the conflict
between such competing policy objectives and underscored the
need for new mechanisms on all levels of government to reconcile
such conflicts. This need is the major near-term challenge that
faces land use planners and attorneys.
The excesses of urbanization are generally the result of our
society's lack of planning and foresight and its continued willing-
ness to allow and even encourage excessive development. It must
be recognized that urbanization has been the byproduct of an
increase in the economic well-being of our society and that the
policies which promoted it have also created jobs and promoted a
higher standard of living. Those policies, however, when viewed
in retrospect, have led beyond the original planners' horizons to
excessive growth and urbanization. While we cannot state that
another course would have proved more beneficial, it is clear that a
continuation of those policies would have led to a substantial
diminution in the overall quality of life in this state. A major
change in those policies is now occurring and should be embraced
creatively. New and revised institutions, mechanisms and tools
should be devised which permit the effective and equitable resolu-
tion of the problems of excessive urbanization in the context of the
entire range of issues confronting our society. This article discuss-
es one such tool-the specific plan.
(West Supp. 1976) (authorizing Attorney General to maintain actions for
equitable relief to protect natural resources from pollution, impairment or
destruction).
7. See generally ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RE-
SOURCE SERVICE, Library of Congress, 93d CONG. 1ST SEss.; NATIONAL LAND
USE POLIcY LEGISLATION, 93d CONG., AN ANALYSIS OF LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
AND STATE LAWS (prepared at the request of the Senate Committee on In-
terior and Insular Affairs, April, 1973); and SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR AN
INSULAR AFFAIRS, LAND USE POLICY AND PLANNING ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 268,
93d CONG., 1ST SESS. (1973). See also note 99 infra.
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II. THE EVOLUTION AND FAILURE OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS
A. Private Property
Many of the recent innovations in land use regulation present
fundamental questions regarding the basic concepts upon which
the ownership of land in this country is based. One of these
concepts is private property, an institution both contemplated and
protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution as well as by most state constitutions.8 Private
property may not be taken for public use without the payment of
just compensation. In certain cases when the regulation of land
passes beyond permissible limits, it constitutes a "taking" of private
property for which compensation must be paid.9
In order to understand the concept of private property and its
relationship to permissible regulation, it must be viewed in its
historical context. The existing system of private property and the
principles upon which it is based have their roots in English law.10
The institution of land ownership in England, as it existed prior to
Independence, consisted of a feudal system of multi-tiered land
tenures with incidental services and obligations in which the regu-
latory authority of the Crown and Parliament was relatively unre-
stricted. The only limitations on the taking of private property by
the Crown were procedural in nature; that is, a taking could not
occur except in accordance with the laws established by Parlia-
ment. Compensation was a legislative prerogative and not a mat-
8. "Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use with-
out just compensation having first been made ... " (Emphasis added) CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 14.
9. For a discussion of the conflict between private property and public
regulation and the "taking issue" generally, see BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, THE
QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971); BOSSELMAN, CALLIES AND
BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE (1973); Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis
for City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650 (1958); Dunham, PROPERTY, CrrY
PLANNING AND LIBERTY, in LAW AND LAND 28 (C. Haar ed. 1964); Michelman,
Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Sax, Takings, Pri-
vate Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L. J. 149 (1971); Van Alstyne,
Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search for Inverse Condemna-
tion Criteria, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. (1971); Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse
Condemnation: A Legislative Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 1 (1967);
Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Comprehensive Planning, 13
SANTA CLARA LAWYER 183 (1972).
10. See THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9 at 53-81.
ter of right. The harshness of the legislative act, or any mitigation
of its effect upon the private landowner, was left to the discretion
of Parliament.
When transmitted to the colonies, however, this English precedent
was substantially affected by the abundance of land to be settled as
well as by a popular aversion to centralized authority." The result
was an increase in the rights of the owner of land and a corre-
sponding decrease in the rights and interests of the public. The
strength of the concept of private property in this country was
reflected in several early state constitutions and the Fifth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution which departed from Eng-
lish precedent by requiring the payment of "just compensation." In
addition, governmental authority over land use was delegated to
the lowest levels of government.
During the next century the public rights and interests in real
property were further diminished as the federal and state govern-
ments undertook major programs to divest themselves of land in
which they had held title in order to, among other things, provide
revenue 'and encourage settlement.' The result was a vast in-
crease in the amount of lands held in private ownership as well as a
deference to private decision-making with respect to land use and
development. 18  Land was plentiful. Its development was encour-
aged and restrictions on land use were comparatively few.
Until shortly after 1900, a compensable taking of property was
held to have occurred only if government took title to, or at least
11. Id. at 81-104.
12. See generally Public Land Law Review Commission, HISTORY OF
PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, Chapters IV, VII-XI (1968), prepared in
connection with the Commission's Report, ONE-THMD OF THE NATION'S LAND,
a Report to the President and Congress (June, 1970).
13. In California, this divesture of lands was speeded by the confirma-
tion of private ownership of large tracts of coastal lands comprising Mexi-
can and Spanish ranchos pursuant to the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo of
1848. See e.g., GILLINGHAM, THE RANCHO SAN PEDRO (1961). While the con-
firmation of rancho lands generally excluded tide, submerged, swamp and
overflowed lands, the federal and state governments proceeded to dispose
of such' excluded lands with widespread sales. In excess of 65,000 acres
of swamp lands were sold pursuant to the Swamp Lands Acts of 1849, 1850
and 1860. See SHAW & FREIDLINE, WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES 5
(1956); HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT, supra note 12 at 325.
The State Lands Commission estimates that there are approximately 80,000
acres (125 square miles) of patented tidelands within the State of Cali-
fornia. Taylor, Patented Tidelands: A Naked Fee? Marks v. Whitney and
The Public Trust Easement, 47 CAL. ST. B.J. 420, 421 (1972). Had it not
been for restrictive court decisions with respect to these conveyances (see,
e.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913)), a substan-
tial portion of these tidelands, including much of San Francisco Bay, would
now be filled and appropriated to private use.
(VOL. 3: S26, 1976] Conflicts in Land Use
PEPPEPDINE LAW REVIEW
possession of, lands in private ownership. Government regulation
which only restricted the use of property but did not result in
governmental ownership or possession was generally held not to
constitute a taking.
14
In the early part of this century, a different view of real property
developed.1 This view regarded ownership as a bundle of rights
and interests, reflecting the manner in which real property interests
were increasingly being fractionalized. This view was given recog-
nition by the United States Supreme Court in 1922 when land use
regulation was rapidly on the increase. In that year Justice
Holmes wrote his historic opinion in the case of Pennsylvania Coal
Company v. Mahon.' Pennsylvania had enacted a law forbidding
the mining of coal in such a way as to cause the subsidence of any
,residential structure. The Pennsylvania Coal Company owned
certain real property but conveyed it away, reserving a right to
14. Bosselman, et al., THE TAKING ISSUE, supra note 9 at 105 et seq.
For example, where a contract required land to be used as a cemetery, a
city was permitted to prohibit the development of the cemetery because
of the "evil vapors" that would result. Brice Presbyterian Church v. City
of New York, 5 Law. 537 (N.Y. 1826). The covering of creeks could be
prohibited for sanitary reasons. Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 183 (Mass. 1831).
The removal of stones, sand and gravel from certain lands could be pro-
hibited. Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Metc. 55 (Mass. 1846). The es-
tablishment of harbor lines beyond which structures could not be built was
permitted. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1853). The prohibi-
tion of liquor production was held to be a permissible exercise of the police
power even though it resulted in the closing of a brewery. Mugler v. Kan-
sas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). However, the United States Supreme Court
stopped short of allowing the damming of water which resulted in the inun-
dation of privately-owned lands. The Court reasoned that such damming
resulted in a physical "taking." Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166
(1871).
15. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87
(1926), in which the court acknowledged a changing climate in land use
control':
Building zone laws are of modern origin. They began in this
country about twenty-five years ago. Until recent years, urban
life was comparatively simple; but with the great increase and
concentration of population, problems have developed, and con-
stantly are developing, which require, and will continue to require,
additional restrictions in respect of [sic] the use and occupation
of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom,
necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions,
are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century
ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected
as arbitrary and oppressive.
16. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
mine the underlying coal. It was stipulated that since the overly-
ing lands were now used for residential purposes, the affect of the
state statute was to render mining uneconomical. The coal compa-
ny contended that the statute deprived it of property without
compensation; the statute was defended as being a bona fide
exercise of the state's police power. Holding in effect that the right
to mine was property subject to the protections of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, Justice Holmes wrote:
'For practical purposes, the right to coal consists in the right to
mine it.' . . . What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that
it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially imprac-
ticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for
constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it.17 (foot-
note omitted)
The question then in determining whether property had been
confiscated was whether its value had been destroyed as the result
of government action.
Justice Holmes recognized that valid police power regulation
might reduce the value of property without requiring compensa-
tion, but he argued that when regulation goes "too far"'8 a taking
occurs:
One fact for consideration in determining [the limit of permissible
regulation] is the extent of the diminution. When it reaches a
certain magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exer-
cise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act.19
Thus, the legacy of the Mahon case is two-fold: implicit in the
ownership of property is the right to profitably use or develop it
and, accordingly, regulation which goes "too far" in restricting this
right of development or use constitutes a taking.
Until recently, little had been done to further define the point at
which the exercise of regulation becomes a "taking. ' 20  There is
general concurrence that this issue "is still at a point of develop-
ment where it is more readily amendable to ad hoc pragmatic
analysis than to conceptionally symmetrical generalization."' 21 The
17. Id. at 414.
18. Id. at 415.
19. Id. at 413.
20. It is clear, however, that zoning undeveloped property for a less val-
uable use than that for which it could be used is not a "taking" for which
compensation must be paid. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
21. Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legislative
Prospectus, supra note 9 at 25; "There is no set formula to determine where
regulation ends and taking begins." Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590, 594 (1962).
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openness of this issue may be largely attributable to a lack of
governmental interest in the area of land use regulation (except to
promote and encourage development). As a result the use of land
has remained virtually unregulated except by local schemes such as
zoning which have proven inadequate to deal with the problems of
modern urbanization.22
Recent and growing public and governmental concern over the
excesses of urbanization has intensified the need for a further
definition of the limits of the rights of the public in privately owned
lands, either by formulating principles for the application of the
Holmesian concept so that an accepted and understood line be-
tween public and private rights can be established, or by discarding
the Holmesian concept and returning to the earlier rule that a
taking only occurs when title or possession has been taken for a
public use.
Under either approach the physical taking of property would
require compensation, although some questions could arise in de-
termining the circumstances which would constitute a "physical
taking." Under either approach, regulation to prevent external
harm would generally not constitute a compensable taking (al-
though the definition of external harm could be debated). In any
event the requirements of equal protection and due process would
still be applicable. The development of other principles becomes
significant only if the Holmesian concept is followed.
Recent cases have tended to quality the assumed right of an
owner to develop his property. For example, in Just v. Marinette
County,2 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that an owner of
lands adjacent to a lake, which for purposes of the ordinance in
question were characterized as "wetlands", had no constitutionally
protected right to fill and develop them.24 In California, the
Supreme Court recently held in HFH, LTD. v. Superior Court of
Los Angeles County25 that an action for inverse condemnation will
22. See generally Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nui-
sance Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. Ciu. L. REV. 681 (1973);
and Comment, Land Use Control in Metropolitan Areas: The Failure of
Zoning and a Proposed Alternative, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 335 (1972).
23. 56 Wisc. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 (1972).
24. Id. at 22, 201 N.W.2d at 770-71.
25. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
S33
not lie as the result of a rezoning of undeveloped property which
reduces its market value. Instead, the injured landowner's remedy
is a writ of mandate if the rezoning was arbitrary or discriminato-
ry.2 6 It would appear that these cases strongly support the propo-
sition that a landowner's right to use his land as he pleases is
subject to the government's authority to prohibit development with-
out the payment of compensation so long as there is no taking in a
physical sense and other constitutional and statutory safeguards are
complied with. From an institutional viewpoint this places a great
deal more discretion in the legislative body to determine the extent
to which the development of land may be restricted. 27 The broad
scope of such discretion carries a great potential for arbitrary,
discriminatory or inequitable action and it may therefore be antici-
pated that local legislative bodies will be judicially required to more
articulately justify their decisions.
Historically, then, the trend in the United States has been to
expand the concept of private property and the assumed right of
development at the expense of the government's authority to regu-
late. Responding to the need to curb some of the excesses of
urbanization, recent decisions have reversed that trend, seeking
instead to limit the assumed right of the landowner to develop and
to increase the effective authority of government to restrict devel-
opment. This change has given local government both a greater
discretion in the development of its land use plans and policies as
well as an equitable burden, subject to increasing judicial scrutiny,
to act as a fair and impartial arbiter in resolving land use conflicts.
The local agency will need to develop new legal tools and mecha-
nisms to adequately perform and sustain this enhanced role and
concomitant burden.
B. Local Land Use Planning and Regulation
1. Local Regulation in General
Historically, land use planning and regulation in California has
been delegated to the lowest levels of government and articulated
in the form of zoning schemes 28 and subdivision ordinances 29
26. Id. at 518-19, 542 P.2d at 244-45, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
27. [L]egislative rather than judicial action holds the key to any
useful reform. The welter of proposals for action to remedy the
inequities in the scheme of land use regulation which fall short
of invoking constitutional protection bear ample witness to the
ferment in this area.
Id. at 521-22, 542 P.2d at 247, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375.
28. Zoning regulations are authorized by CAL. GOVT CODE §§ 65800-65912
(West Supp. 1976).
29. Subdivision Map Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 66410-66499 (West Supp.
1976).
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under the aegis of a general plan 30 which until recently consisted of
little more than platitudes which lay unconsulted after once having
being articulated. The ability of such fragmented regulatory
schemes to adequately cope with excessive urbanization is doubt-
ful. For example, the effectiveness of zoning, the principle tool of
land use regulation, is limited by a number of factors, including,
among others, the following:
a. Zoning schemes in the past have assumed that land can
be developed and used for at least the purpose zoned, and if
the market indicates a "higher" use the zoning designation will
be changed accordingly. Zoning will generally not be reduced
or rolled back, and any increase in the value of land as a result
of a zone change should flow to the owner.
b. Zoning is based on end-state planning; that is, the distri-
bution of uses in different zones is articulated as 'if all uses
could be developed simultaneously. Zoning does not provide
for change in land use over time.
c. Zoning is rigid in that it generally does not contemplate
administrative discretion in its application to specific situa-
tions. This rigidity has been diminished somewhat by, for
example, schemes which provide for the issuance of conditional
use permits, the expanded use of variances and the develop-
ment of special zones (such as planned unit development
zones) which contemplate the exercise of broader administra-
tive discretion. There is a tendency, however, for these
arrangements to be administered on an ad hoc basis without
adequate consideration or articulation of underlying and long-
term objectives. This ad hoc approach is particularly inap-
propriate in many areas, such as the coastal zone, where the
policies, programs and interests of a great number of concerned
governmental agencies and diverse interests must be considered
and reconciled.
d. Zoning is passive in nature. It contemplates that the
landowner will determine the sequence of development and,
in many cases, the zone designation itself.
e. Zoning is parochial in that its effect ends with the bound-
aries of the local agency and it is often the product of a legisla-
30. See CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65350-65402 (West Supp. 1976).
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tive body which represents only the present residents of the
local area and may not be representative of all of the owners
of the lands regulated or of all of the people affected. While
the legislative bodies are authorized to consider planning fac-
tors relating to lands beyond their jurisdiction, they generally
do not. The result has been a highly parochial, fragmented
patchwork of regulations.
f. The aspects of land use which may be controlled by
zoning are insufficient to achieve many of the planning objec-
tives which are now of concern. Control of density or the
provision of housing for the elderly, for example, can be ac-
complished, if at all, only with great imprecision.
Zoning was supplemented at an early time by the Subdivision
Map Act3 l which was intended to assure that the boundaries of
subdivided lands are coherent; however, the regulatory procedure
established by the Act proved to be a convenient point of regula-
tion for other purposes. Now, before a subdivision map is ap-
proved, certain improvements and dedications may be required
including the dedication of land for parks (or the payment of fees
in lieu thereof) .32
There has been little formal coordination between these regula-
tory schemes. The result has been that long-range planning deci-
sions tend to be made in the context of considering individual
projects presented to a local agency for approval. In addition,
because of the different thrusts of the various regulatory schemes,
irrational differences in treatment result. For example, a develop-
er may be required to dedicate lands as a condition to the approval
of a subdivision map while no such condition may be imposed
upon the issuance of a building permit. Accordingly, the develop-
er of a condominium project which is subject to the Subdivision
Map Act may be required to relinquish part of his land for park
purposes, while the developer of an identical apartment project
may be free from this requirement. Similarly, since the approval
of a subdivision map is considered to be discretionary while the
31. Subdivision Map Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE §§ 66410-66499 (West Supp.
1976).
32. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1976) permits a city or county
to require that a subdivider dedicate land for park or recreational purposes
or pay a fee in lieu thereof as a condition of the approval of a final sub-
division map. The predecessor of this provision was upheld as constitu-
tional in Associated Home Builders v. City of Walnut Creek, 4 Cal. 3d 633,
484 P.2d 606, 94 Cal. Rptr. 630 (1971). See also Heyman & Gilhool, The
Constitutionality of Imposing Increased Community Costs on New Subdivi-
sion Exactions, 73 YALE L.J. 1119 (1964).
S36
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issuance of a building permit is ministerial, the developer of a high
rise condominium may be required to submit to the local agency's
time consuming environmental review process under the California
Environmental Quality Act of 197033 while the developer of an
identical apartment building may escape such a review process. 4
The general plan, authorized by California law since 1927, 3
provided the opportunity for such coordination. However, such
plans have generally proven to be little more than statements of
objectives and recommendations too vague to be useful. Perhaps
this has been due to fears that a too carefully detailed general plan
might give rise to inverse condemnation. A more likely explana-
tion is that the lack of a detailed general plan has permitted local
decision makers to keep their options open, to avoid controversy
and to continue regulating on an ad hoc basis or according to their
own undisclosed plans.36
2. Innovative Regulatory Programs
Reflecting an appreciation of the inadequacies of zoning and
subdivision regulations a number of local agencies have developed
new programs to deal with excessive urbanization. Innovation in
land use regulatory schemes began in California, as in other states,
with areas of special concern-flood plains, hillsides, natural and
scenic areas and tide and submerged lands.3 7
A number of cities have initiated programs to limit their popula-
tion and structural density and to provide for growth manage-
ment.38 In general, however, these schemes are often simply
superimposed on traditional regulations and represent only patch-
work and stopgap attempts to limit further growth. Frequently,
these schemes are only an expression of the parochial interests of
the local electorate which may not be a foundation for farsighted or
equitable land use planning which will affect landowners (some of
whom may be non-residents and non-voters) as well as regional
and occasional statewide interests.
33. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976) ("CEQA").
34. CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21080 (West Supp. 1976).
35. 1927 Cal. Stats. ch. 874.
36. See authorities cited note 108 infra.
37. See authorities cited notes 5-6 supra.
38. Some cities have simply revised the permissible zoning downward,
While the courts have been increasingly willing to expand the
authority of government to regulate and restrict land development,
there has been a growing tendency to require that restrictions not
be arbitrary or designed to benefit only those local interests repre-
while others are limiting development based upon the adequacy of public
services and other related factors.
The City of Irvine has adopted a residential development permit scheme
which requires a permit to be obtained before developing new subdivisions
within the city. The permit is issued only upon a finding by the Planning
Commission that certain public facilities (utilities, sewer facilities, water,
drainage, police protection, fire protection, park and recreation facilities,
roads and other local transportation) are adequate to provide services to
the new development. This finding is mandatory if the developer has suffi-
cient "points" as determined from a schedule which provides a certain num-
ber of points for each type of service available. Irvine, Cal. § 12, Urgency
Interim Ordinance, December 18, 1973. Concurrent with the establishment
of this system, the city adopted a capital improvements program to provide
such services on a fixed schedule. The plan is based on a scheme similar
to that which was judicially upheld in Golden v. Planning Board of Town
of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
The so-called "Petaluma Plan", adopted by the city of Petaluma, limits
housing development growth rate to 500 dwelling units per year. The plan
includes complex procedures and criteria by which the 500 development-
unit permits are awarded to competing developers. According to the sys-
tem, points are awarded for conformity of a proposed project to the city's
general plan and its environmental design plan, for good architectural de-
sign, and for providing low and moderate income housing and recreational
facilities. The plan further provides for the establishment of a 200-foot
wide "green belt" around the city to serve as a boundary for any urban
expansion during the term of the plan. This plan has been upheld by the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. See Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of
Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
The Urban Development Policy of the city of San Jose, revised and
adopted in November 1974, seeks to confine future development outside of
existing urban developed areas by regulating the extension of urban facili-
ties, utilities and services to new areas. The extension of such services is
to be in conformity with a five-year capital improvement program. Lands
which are not funded or programmed in the capital improvement program
are generally not to be developed.
The city of Livermore instituted a "development rights transfer" scheme
to concentrate development in areas of greater proximity to city services
and facilities. Under this system, certain areas will be designated "con-
servation areas" in which development will not be permitted. Owners of
such lands will receive transferable development rights which may be sold
to property owners in other areas where development is permitted only if
supplemental development rights are acquired. See Livermore, Cal., Gen-
eral Plan-1959-1990 (1959), as amended in 1972.
The city of Milpitas has limited all new development to the number of
residential units which the city is able to "absorb" as indicated by a formula
keyed to the capacity of the city's school district and the increase in the
number of pupils caused by varying types of residential development. Once
the amount of development which will be permitted is determined, applica-
tions for zoning changes or residential permits are granted on a "first-come-
first-served" priority. Milpitas, Cal., § 8, Ordinance 38.235, December 5,
1972.
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sented in the legislative body. Courts have increasingly been
willing to question the adequacy of general plans 9 and to examine
the extraterritorial effects of local regulations. 40  In connection
with phased development, for example, the court in Golden v.
Planning Board of Ramapo41 was careful to note that the regulato-
ry scheme was not designed to preclude development but rather to
provide for it in an efficient manner.42 Historically, judicial con-
cern has been articulated primarily with respect to the exclusion of
racial minority groups and the poor.43  More recently, however,
the courts have begun to ask whether local regulatory schemes are
in accord with the "general welfare" of areas outside of the local
jurisdiction, thus construing the power of local agencies to enact
ordinances for the "general welfare" as a limitation as well as a
grant of authority. 44 In California, while the court upheld a Los
39. See Coalition for Los Angeles County Planning v. Board of Super-
visors (no. C-63218, Superior Court, County of Los Angeles, June 19, 1975);
8 ERC 1249.
40. See, e.g., Southern Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 161, 336 A.2d 713, 723-4 (1975).
41. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
42. Id. at 172, 285 N.E.2d at 302, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
43. See, e.g., Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. City of Union
Hill, Cal., 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970). See generally Freilich & Bass, Ex-
clusionary Zoning: Suggested Litigation Approaches, 3 URBAN L. 344
(1971), and Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Pro-
tection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). With regard to judi-
cial suspicions of exclusionary zoning generally, see Lamm & Davison, The
Legal Control of Population Growth and Distribution in a Quality Environ-
ment: The Land Use Alternatives, 49 DENVER L. J. 1 (1972); Bingham &
Bostick, Exclusionary Zoning Practices: Examination of the Current Con-
troversy, 25 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1972); Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town
of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972); National Land and Investment
Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965); Board of County Supervisors
of Fairfax County v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Appeal
of Kit-Mar Builders, Inc., 439 Pa. 466, 268 A.2d 765 (1970); Appeal of Girsch,
437 Pa. 237, 263 A.2d 395 (1970); Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Mont-
gomery County Council, 254 Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969); Kavanewsky v.
Zoning Board of Appeals of the Town of Warren, 160 Conn. 397, 279 A.2d
567 (1971). But see Confederacion de la Raza Unida v. City of Morgan
Hill, 324 F. Supp. 895 (N.D. Cal. 1971), where the court upheld hillside zon-
ing over objections that the regulatory scheme was exclusionary. However,
the court noted that the general plan of the city with respect to housing
had not been attacked as exclusionary.
44. In Steel Hill Development, Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, supra note
43, while the court upheld a 6-acre lot zoning ordinance on the grounds
that basic value judgments should be left to legislative determination, it
stated:
S39
Altos Hills scheme virtually banishing all commercial uses of prop-
erty from the city, it emphasized that the general welfare of the
"community or region" would not suffer and that such uses are
adequately provided outside the city.
45
Courts are also beginning to require that zoning and similar
regulatory schemes be "balanced"; 46 that is, a city may not permit
only uses (such as industry) which will increase its tax base and
expect other cities to assume the accompanying burden of provid-
ing residences for the employees of that industry.4 7 The New
Jersey Supreme Court recently held that a local agency must
provide for its share of regional housing needs and that nonresi-
dents and prospective residents have standing to challenge the
violation of this rule.
48
Finally, courts are beginning to recognize the quasi-judicial or
adjudicatory function of many zoning decisions, including zoning
We are faced with "a local legislative determination that the gen-
eral welfare will be promoted by exclusion of an unwanted use
from a non-metropolitan community [which exclusion] is not
likely to conflict with a regional need for local space for that use."
Id. at 961. See also Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
117 N.J. Super. 11, 14, 283 A.2d 353, 356 (1971).
45. Town of Los Altos Hills v. Adobe Creek Properties, Inc., 32 Cal. App.
3d 488, 509, 108 Cal. Rptr. 271, 287 (1973).
46. "The test must be whether it [the zoning ordinance] promotes rea-
sonably a balanced and well ordered plan for the entire municipality."
Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 117 N.J. Super. 11 at
15, 283 A.2d 353 at 357 (1971).
47. See generally Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison,
supra note 46; Note, Zoning-Municipal Corporations-General Welfare as a
Zoning Purpose Held to Encompass Local and Regional Housing Needs, 26
RUTGERS L. REV. 401 (1973).
48. Southern 'Burlington County N.A.A.C.P. v. Township of Mount
Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 at 155 n.3, 336 A.2d 713 at 717 n.3 (1975). Whether the
parties challenging a proposed land use decision have standing to do so may
be as critical as whether there is any substantive cause of action. In Town-
ship of Mount Laural, the New Jersey Supreme Court rather easily found
standing on the part of nonresidents of Mt. Laurel who were effectively
excluded from residence in the city by virtue of the challenged zoning ordi-
nance. In Construction Industry Ass'n v. Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), however, an association of builders and developers was held to have
no standing to assert that Petaluma's housing and zoning plan violated the
constitutional right to travel. Since plaintiffs' actual injury was outside of
the "Zone of Interest" of the constitutional right being asserted, the court
held that there was no "case or controversy" as required by Article III of
the U.S. Constitution. Id. at 903-04.
It is clear, however, that a plaintiff challenging the validity of a local
land use regulation need not own property which is subject to such regula-
tion nor be a resident of the regulating jurisdiction to have standing if it can
be demonstrated that the regulation has a direct, intended and immediate
effect upon plaintiff's property. Id. at 905. Accord Scott v. City of Indian
Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 548-49, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1972).
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amendments. Accordingly, when such decisions affect vested
rights, due process considerations come into play and judicial
review becomes more rigorous. 49
In summary, land use policy has historically been left to local
government and to the market place. The result has been the
promotion of development which yields profits for the developers
and the local economy. During the past ten years there has been a
growing realization that, although they are important, developer
profit and the promotion of the local economy may not be coinci-
dent with the highest quality of life for the residents of the area or
to the overall benefit of those who may otherwise profit economi-
cally from such development. Local governments are now at-
tempting to make existing mechanisms, such as zoning and subdi-
vision regulations, more flexible and to develop new programs to
phase or limit development and to provide for open space and
other public purposes.
While courts have generally accepted experimentation and stop-
gap measures, it is inevitable that legislatively or judicially formu-
lated safeguards will increasingly be imposed to assure that local
government does not arbitrarily limit a land owner's right to use his
land and that local land use policies are consistent with regional
and statewide concerns.
In light of the foregoing, it can be anticipated that local govern-
ment will be required to develop its land use policy with greater
care and to articulate in greater detail the manner in which that
policy takes into consideration and reconciles the concerns of the
private landowner, local interests and regional and state interests.50
C. Regional and State Land Use Planning and Regulation
The only provisions in California law for general statewide
planning are those establishing the Office of Planning and Re-
search5 l which is advisory in nature and expressly has no operating
49. Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
See also Cunningham, Rezoning by Amendment as an Administrative or
Quasi-Judicial Act, 73 MICH. L.R. 1341 (1975). See note 71 infra.
50. These "concerns" will include the constitutional mandates of pro-
cedural and substantive due process, equal protection and the right to
travel.
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65025-65049 (West Supp. 1976).
or regulatory powers.5 2 The State has generally abrogated its plan-
ning responsibilities in favor of local government. 58 Most state-
wide planning is undertaken by state agencies with specific charges
and therefore can not be considered comprehensive.
Within the past ten years, however, the state has created several
regional and state programs to provide for comprehensive planning
and regulation. The Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,5 4 the San
Francisco Bay Conservation and Development Commission55 and
the Coastal Zone Conservation Commission' are examples of a
trend toward region level planning.57 State responsibility for ad-
ministering and developing guidelines for environmental impact
reports as well as for certain elements of local general plans also
evidence the growth of a state presence in the land use planning
area.
5 8
With the growing recognition that the problems of excessive
urbanization extend beyond local regulatory boundaries, a number
of proposals have been made which would promote greater coordi-
nation of the various planning and regulatory schemes on a region-
al and state level. 59 Generally, this legislation would provide for
the establishment of a state planning and regulatory agency which
would develop statewide priorities and principles upon which local
regulatory systems would be based. To assure the conformity of
local plans to these priorities, the agency would retain sufficient
authority, either directly or through regional agencies, to review
such plans as well as certain specific land use decisions of regional
or statewide concern such as decisions with respect to key facilities
(e.g. power plants or transportation facilities), regional and large
scale developments (e.g. major shopping centers or large residen-
tial tracts), and sensitive, significant or critical environmental areas
(e.g. wetlands or timberlands).60 So far, however, none of these
proposals has been enacted.
52. See Marks & Taber, Prospects for Regional Planning in California,
4 PAC. L.J. 117 (1973).
53. CAL. GOVT. CODE § 65030 (West Supp. 1976).
54. See authorities cited note 3 supra.
55. See authorities cited note 2 supra.
56. See authorities cited note 4 supra.
57. See also CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65060-65069.5 (West Supp. 1976), provid-
ing for the establishment of Regional Planning Districts.
58. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21083, 21104, 21150, 21153, 21165 (West
Supp. 1976).
59. See note 114 infra.
60. See BOSSELMAN & CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN LAND-USE
CONTROLS, supra note 9; NATIONAL LAND-USE POLICY LEGISLATION, supra note
7.
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The inefficiency which results from the lack of comprehensive
state land use policy is obvious. It is intolerable, for example, to
have the Department of Transportation plan major highways to
serve an area which another agency intends to preserve in a rural or
primitive state. All cities should not be able to restrict further
growth if it means that there will be no place designated to
accommodate future increases in population. Nor should the cost
of such inefficiency go unrecognized. The cost is borne by the
users of the land, by the taxpayers who support government and
ultimately by everyone. The state cannot long afford a .system of
approvals which requires that an application for development per-
mit be submitted in seriatim to a large number of agencies, each.
having the authority to halt a project until its own parochial
objectives have been satisfied. An effective system of planning
must combine a degree of efficiency with a mechanism for recon-
ciling the conflicting interests of the private sector, as well as the
concerns of the public at all levels of government.
The major problem with respect to increased state and regional
planning and regulation relates to maintaining a proper balance of
power or sharing of authority among the various affected agencies.
Undoubtedly, there is a broad consensus that the development of
land use policy should continue to be the primary responsibility of
local government since it is accessible and provides a degree of
human responsiveness and flexibility which is generally not availa-
ble from regional, state or federal agencies. A consensus probably
also exists that there are important considerations of regional and
statewide scope which should be reflected in local land use policies.
The problem is that local governments, as well as private landown-
ers, are fearful of relinquishing any authority to regional and state
agencies because of their lack of control over the processes which
might evolve. Accordingly, it is extremely important in develop-
ing processes for the recognition and reconciliation of private,
local, regional and statewide interests that assurances are provided
to prevent a usurpation of authority.
D. Summary
The institutions which have evolved in this country and within
California to deal with the planning and regulation of land use
have encouraged overdevelopment and are inadequate to deal with
the problems which have resulted. As a result, the courts have
become increasingly sympathetic to the expansion of government
discretion in limiting development and to the erosion of the as-
sumed "developability" of land, once thought to be implicit in the
concept of "private property." Concurrently, government is in-
creasing its involvment in land use planning and regulation at all
levels through a multitude of fragmented programs and schemes
aimed at curbing the excesses of urbanization.
The shortcomings of this patchwork of programs and the need
for improvement are generally acknowledged. A more effective
assault on the problem will require the examination of issues at the
very core of our institutions relating to land ownership and its use
and regulation. This task has been addressed with some trepida-
tion. The pressing problems of excessive urbanization, however,
make it imperative that a high priority be given to the development
of new mechanisms to assure the efficient, effective and equitable
reconciliation of private, local, regional and state interests and
policies in land. One such mechanism is the specific plan.
III. THE SPECIFIC PLAN AS A TOOL FOR DEALING
WITH LAND USE PROBLEMS
A. California Provisions For Specific Plans
1. Authority and Scope
Sections 65450-65552 of the California Government Code au-
thorize any city or county to prepare a specific plan containing the
regulations, programs and legislation necessary to implement its
general plan. Such specific plans are derived from the "precise
plans" of earlier legislation6' and are principally distinguished from
61. The origins of the specific plan in California can be traced to the
Conservation and Planning Act. Cal. Stats., ch. 807, § 49, p. 1915 (1947),
as amended by Cal. Stats. ch. 868, § 7, p. 2045 (1947). Section 49 of that
Act authorized the legislative bodies of cities and counties to establish plan-
ning commissions to "prepare precise sections of master plans or detailed
or precised plans based thereon" which could include
proposed regulations limiting the uses of land, the uses of build-
ings, the height and bulk of buildings, the open spaces about
buildings, the location of buildings and other improvements with
respect to existing or planned rights-of-way and such other mat-
ters as will accomplish the purposes of this Act, including pro-
cedure for the administration of such regulations.
In 1951 this Act was replaced by CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65250-65254 (West
1951) which again called for the creation of "precise plans" having substan-
tially the same scope as those provided for in the Conservation and Plan-
ning Act. Such plans still consisted primarily of regulations concerning the
construction and location of buildings.
Article 8 was in turn superceded by CAL. GovT. CODE § 65600 (West 1966)
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general plans by their more detailed and specific application.
The planning agency, which each county and city in California is
required to establish,6 2 may on its own initiative (and must if
directed by its legislative body) prepare specific plans based upon
that city's or county's general plan and drafts of such regulations,
programs and legislation as may in its judgment be required for the
systematic execution of the general plan.63 Such plans and mea-
sures are then recommended to the legislative body for adoption.
The legislative body of the city or county may itself initiate the
establishment of a specific plan or an amendment to an existing
specific plan, but it must first refer the proposal to the planning
commission for a report.64
A specific plan must include "all detailed regulations, condi-
tions, programs and proposed legislation which shall be necessary
or convenient for the systematic implementation of each
[mandatory] element of the general plan .... ,"5 California
Government Code Section 65302 sets forth the mandatory ele-
ments of a general plan: land use (designating the proposed
general distribution, location, extent and density of varying types of
land use), traffic circulation, housing standards, conservation of
natural resources, open-space,66 seismic safety, noise and scenic
highways.
A specific plan may, but is not required to, include detailed
regulations, conditions, programs and proposed legislation which
may be necessary or convenient for the systematic implementation
of any general plan element set forth in Government Code Section
which authorized the planning commission to "prepare precise plans based
on the master plan and drafts of such regulations, programs and legislation
as may in its judgment be required for the systematic execution of the
master." The reference to "programs" and "legislation" was the first glim-
mer of recognition of the precise plan as a tool for future planning and
development beyond its purely regulatory function. This recognition was
not complete, however, since Section 65601, describing the contents of a pre-
cise plan, still substantially incorporated the language of the 1947 Conserva-
tion and Planning Act dealing with the construction and location of build-
ings.
62. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65100 (West Supp. 1976).
63. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65450 (West 1966).
64. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65507 (West Supp. 1976).
65. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65451 (West Supp. 1976).
66. This is more particularly described in CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65560 et
seq. (West Supp. 1976).
65303.67 This section lists the discretionary elements of a general
plan: recreation (natural reservations, parks, parkways, beaches,
playgrounds, etc.), supplemental traffic circulation matters, trans-
portation (rights-of-way, terminals, viaducts, ports, harbors, avia-
tion, etc.), public transit (rapid transit, street car, motor coach,
trolley coach lines, etc.), public services and facilities (sewage,
refuse disposal, drainage, utilities), public buildings (civic centers,
schools, libraries, police and fire stations), community design,
housing standards, redevelopment, historic preservation and
"[s]uch additional elements . . . which in the judgment of the
planning agency relate to the physical development 'of the county
or city." Thus, the authorized contents of a specific plan incorpo-
rates the general plan's very broad scope of mandatory and permis-
sible subject matter.
In addition to the foregoing, a specific plan is expressly required
to include regulations, conditions, programs and proposed legisla-
tion with regard to the following-,
(a) The location of housing, business, industry, open space, agri-
culture, recreational, educational, religious and waste disposal
facilities, and height, bulk and set-back regulations;
(b) The location, names and numbers, and construction and
maintenance standards for streets, roads and other transportation
facilities;(c) Standards for population and building density, water sup-
ply and sewage disposal;
(d) Standards for conservation, development and utilization of
natural resources, including prevention and control of flooding,
water pollution and soil erosion;
(e) Implementation of the open-space element required by
Government Code Section 65560 et seq.;
(f) "Such other measures as may be necessary or convenient to
insure the execution of the general plan."68
It is obvious, then, that the scope of a specific plan is very broad,
extending into virtually every facet of the physical development of
a city or a county. More traditional forms of land use regulation,
such as zoning, are included within the scope of a specific plan
even though provided for by their own authorizing legislations. 0
A specific plan need not cover the entire area of the general
plan.70 The planning agency or the legislative body may designate
areas within the city or county for which a specific plan may be
necessary or convenient. Thus, geographic subdivision of the
general plan is clearly envisioned. By inference from the permis-
67. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65452 (West Supp. 1976).
68. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65451 (West Supp. 1976).
69. See CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65800 et seq. (West Supp. 1976).
70. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65450.1 (West Supp. 1976).
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sive language of Government Code Section 65450.1, a specific
plan embracing the entire area of the general plan would also
comply with the statute. Whether the general plan may be subdi-
vided by subject matter rather than geographically is an unresolved
question. Could a city, for example, establish a specific plan for
the implementation of the conservation or circulation elements of
the general plan? Government Code Section 65451 would seem to
proscribe this by requiring that specific plans include all details
necessary for the implementation of each element of the general
plan. On the other hand, the language of Government Code Sec-
tions 65552 (referring to "a specific street or highway plan") and
65553 (referring to "a specific plan regulating the use of open-
space land") would seem to imply that specific plans dealing with
specific subjects can be enacted. If this is true, these sections
would greatly increase the flexibility of cities and counties in
dealing with their unique local planning problems and objectives.
2. Adoption
The procedure for adopting a specific plan is set forth with some
particularity in Government Code Section 65500 et seq. Before a
planning agency can recommend a specific plan to the city or
county legislative body (or can report on a specific plan referred to
it by the legislative body), it must hold at least one public hearing.
The notice of such hearing must meet the requirements set forth in
Government Code Section 65500. This notice, directed generally
to the electorate of the city or county, is appropriate for a planning
matter which is necessarily of general interest and concern. Unlike
a general plan, however, a specific plan may affect particular
parcels of property in a way which might impose an additional
requirement of notice and hearing with respect to owners whose
property uses are substantially affected by its provisions.7 1 The
71. Whether or not notice to affected property owners is constitutionally
required depends on the illusive test of whether the enactment of the spe-
cific plan is under the circumstances an "adjudicative" or "legislative" act.
See generally San Diego Building Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal.
3d 205, 529 P.2d 570, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1974); Scott v. City of Indian Wells,
6 Cal. 3d 541, 548-49, 492 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1972); Kissinger v. City of Los
Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 463, 327 P.2d 10, 16-17 (1958); see also Fasano
v. Board of County Commissioners, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973). It is
quite possible that the standard of notice applied may be stricter in the
case of amendments to a plan than in its original enactment.
mandatory referral to the planning agency and the statutory and
constitutional notice and hearing requirements would appear to
preclude the enactment of a specific plan by initiative.72
After the required public hearing, the planning agency may
recommend the specific plan to the legislative body by way of a
resolution of the planning commission.7 A copy of the specific
plan or amendment recommended must be submitited to the legisla-
tive body together with "a statement of the planning commission's
reasons for such recommendation. ' 74 The predecessor to this
section had required that the planning commission submit "a re-
port of findings. ' 75 In construing this earlier section, it was held
that a resolution of the planning commission merely stating that the
"plan is deemed to be in the public interest" and is "recommended
for adoption by the city council" was insufficient to comply with
the requirements of the statute.7 6 The current section has deleted
the requirement of findings, but it should be expected that the
planning commission will be required to specify its "reasons for
such recommendation" with more particularity than merely the
recitation of their conclusion that it is in the public interest.
Once the specific plan has been recommended to the legislative
body, it is exclusively in the latter's discretion whether it is enacted
or rejected. The recommendation of the planning agency gives the
proposed specific plan no legal effect and obviously creates no
vested rights until adoption by the legislative body.77 Similarly, a
specific plan adopted by the legislative body may not be changed
by the planning commission without the action of the legislative
body.78 Thus, the role of the planning agency is an advisory one
and its recommendations are not binding on the legislative body
which remains free to disregard them.79
Although the legislative body need not accept the advice of the
planning agency, it is required to seek it. Thus, it may not initiate
72. See Simpson v. Hite, 36 Cal.2d 125, 134-35, 222 P.2d 225, 230-31(1950); Peoples Lobby, Inc. v. Board of Supervisors, 30 Cal. App. 3d 869,
873, 106 Cal. Rptr. 666, 669-70 (1973); Oren, The Initiative and Referendum's
Use in Zoning, 64 CAL. L. R. 74 (1976).
73. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65501 (West 1966).
74. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65502 (West 1966).
75. Cal. Stats. 1953, ch. 1355 (repealed 1965).
76. Williams v. City of San Bruno, 217 Cal. App. 2d 480, 488-91, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 858-59 (1963).
77. See Millbrae Ass'n v. Millbrae, 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 246, 69 Cal.
Rptr. 251, 268 (1968).
78. Id. at 242, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 265.
79. See Banville v. County of Los Angeles, 180 Cal. App. 2d 563, 570,
4 Cal. Rptr. 458, 461-62 (1960).
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a specific plan without referring it to the planning agency"0 nor
may it make any change or addition to a recommended specific
plan without referring the change or addition back to the planning
agency for a report.8 ' In the latter event, the failure of the
planning commission to report within four days after the reference
constitutes approval of the change or addition.82 If the legislative
body enacts part of the planning commission's recommendation
and rejects part, there is some ambiguity as to whether this consti-
tutes a "change or addition." In Millbrae Ass'n v. Millbrae,8 3 for
example, it was held that the adoption by a city council of one of
eight related recommended rezonings did not amount to a change
or alteration of the planning commission's recommendation but
only in a reduction in its scope.8 4 Whatever the wisdom of this
rule when applied to zoning ordinances, difficulties would abound
if it were applied to recommended specific plans which are inevita-
bly intertwined packages that cannot be changed in size or scope
without effecting changes in character. Thus, the advisory role of
the planning agency is essential to the legal validity as well as to the
actual quality of a specific plan, and no city with a planning agency
may exclude the agency from this process. 85
Before adopting a proposed specific plan or an amendment
thereto, the legislative body must hold at least one public hearing. 86
Notice of such hearing must conform to the requirements of Gov-
ernment Code Section 65500 as well as to the procedural due
process mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to
affected property owners.87
3. Administration and Effect
Once a specific plan has been adopted, the legislative body-has
broad powers to assure its administration and enforcement. The
legislative body may establish administrative rules and procedures
80. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65507 (West Supp. 1976).
81. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65504 (West Supp. 1976).
82. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65504 (West Supp. 1976).
83. 262 Cal. App. 2d 222, 69 Cal. Rptr. 251 (1968).
84. Id. at 235, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
85. For cities without a planning commission see CAL. GOV'T CODE §
65505 (West 1966).
86. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65503 (West Supp. 1976).
87. See Fasano v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23
(1973).
and may delegate such administrative functions, powers and duties
to the planning agency or some other agency as may be desirable or
necessary.8 The legislative body is further empowered to create
administrative agencies, boards of review, appeal and adjustment
and to provide for other officials and employees to administer and
enforce its specific plans.89
The most important aspect of the specific plan is its legal effect
as a regulatory device. It is in this area that the greatest ambigui-
ties exist in the current legislation. Unlike zoning, which has been
defined by years of experience and by an abundance of case law,
the specific plan is still a relatively new creature in the law. Some
of its effects, however, have been clearly set forth in the Code. The
Subdivision Map Act, for example, provides that no city or county
shall approve a required subdivision map unless its legislative body
"shall find that the proposed subdivision, together with the provi-
sions for its design and improvement, is consistent with the general
plan . . . or any specific plan .... -9 That section further
provides that the subdivision shall only be consistent if the city or
county has officially adopted such a plan and the subdivision is
"compatible with the objectives, policies, general land uses and
programs specified in such a plan."
Streets may not be improved or sewer connections laid or au-
thorized in any street where a specific street or highway plan has
been adopted until the matter has been referred to the planning
agency for a report determining its conformity to such plan and a
copy of the report has been submitted to the legislative body.9 1 The
Government Code does not clearly state whether the legislative
body could authorize such action, notwithstanding a report of
nonconformity, without formally amending the specific plan.
Similarly, streets may not be improved, sewers or connections
laid or public buildings or works constructed within any territory
covered by a specific plan regulating the use of open-space land
until the matter has been referred to the planning agency for a
report determining its conformity to such plan, a copy of the report
has been filed with the legislative body and the legislative body has
made a finding that the proposed improvement, connection or
construction is in conformity with the specific plan.92
88. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65550 (West 1966).
89. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65551 (West 1966).
90. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66473.5, 66474 (West 1966).
91. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65552 (West Supp. 1976).
92. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65553 (West Supp. 1976).
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The enactment of a specific plan may also impose further restric-
tions and requirements of consultation on other agencies under the
operation of certain Code provisions relating to general plans.
93
Such provisions give local government the power to restrict other
governmental agencies or to at least compel consultation to an
extent not possible under other forms of land use regulation such
as zoning.
The specific plan, then, occupies a very special position in the
matrix of local planning. It is the meeting point of a number of
different functions and purposes, the point at which the planning
and regulatory functions merge. More planning and action-orient-
ed than zoning ordinances, the specific plan is more regulatory and
implementation-oriented than the general plan. In short, it is a
mechanism which brings policy and implementation together in
one package. As will be discussed below, such a merger of
functions can provide a very effective mechanism for resolving land
use conflicts.
B. Advantages of the Specific Plan and Possibilities for More
Effective Use
1. Resolution of Local Conflicts in Land Use
Generally, land use regulation reflects underlying social, eco-
nomic and political interests with regard to the lands affected. In
the United States, the interests involved have generally supported
development. This is no longer so. At the present time there is
widespread and persistant conflict among the representatives of
these interests in many areas of this state as to whether develop-
ment should be promoted and, in some cases, whether it should
even be permitted. The specific plan provides a mechanism for
the recognition and reconciliation of these diverse and conflicting
interests.94
93. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 65401, 65402 (West Supp. 1976).
94. See, e.g., M. McCoy & C. Walecka, MARINA DEL REY SUBREGIONAL
PLAN (Univ. of So. Cal., Sea Grant Inst. Prog., 1975). This plan was pre-
pared by a group representing diverse interests (including land developers,
residents and others) as a compromise and reconciliation of the various in-
terests with respect to future land use in the area. The area involved a
rapidly developing marina comprised of a small craft harbor surrounded
by high density residential and recreationally oriented commercial uses
The broad and multifaceted nature of the specific plan permits
an analysis, as part of a single program, of numerous separate
projects and proposals which in the past have generally been
considered separately under conventional regulatory schemes. Ac-
cordingly, the specific plan can provide for a broader spectrum of
trade-offs than are normally available. For example, a group of
citizens attempting to preserve open space may oppose all ad hoc
proposals for facilities which would support further development,
including additional sewer and water facilities. Such a group,
however, might support a specific plan permitting a degree of
development if it contains acceptable comprehensive restrictions on.
the amount, character and location of developments so that indi-
vidual ad hoc development will not result in the aggregate in
excessive growth. Affected landowners and developers may also
support such limitations provided that they receive assurances in
return that some development will be permitted, and, perhaps, that
approvals and permits for that development will be processed on an
expedited basis.
The resourceful planner may find additional elements available
to effect a needed compromise. The plan, for example, may
provide for a capital improvements program to assure developers
that needed public facilities will be provided in accordance with an
agreed upon time schedule,95 a density transfer arrangement to
offset the effect of restrictions imposed, 96 a bonus scheme to re-
ward the provision of public benefits,97 accelerated processing of
permit applications, and, perhaps, tax incentives.98 Compromise
which had been superimposed on an informal beach community of small
deteriorating beach cottages and narrow streets developed during the 1920's
and 1930's as the Venice of the West. The preface of the report suggested
that, in order to become part of the regulatory scheme of the City and
County of Los Angeles, the plan should be "translated to specific plan
standards."
95. See Golden v. Planning Board of Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359 at 373, 285
N.E.2d 291 at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 at 155 (1972).
96. The specific plans adopted by the City of Los Angeles for the West-
wood Village and the Century City areas provide for the transfer of density
within the areas covered by the plans. Los Angeles, Cal., Westwood Village
Ordinance No. 145,043, August 24, 1973; Los Angeles, Cal., Century City
Ordinance No. 146,798, December 6, 1974. See Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: Description and Perspectives for a Critique, in 3 MANAGE-
MENT & CONTROL OF GROWTH 92 (The Urban Land Institute 1975); Com-
ment, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338
(1972).
97. See, e.g., Svirsky, San Francisco: The Downtown Development
Bonus System, in THE NEW ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRATIVE AND ECONOMIC
CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES (N. Marcus & M. Groves ed. 1970).
98. See, e.g., the tax relief provisions of the California Land Conserva-
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may also be obtained by making adjustments in the types and
character of public improvements to be included in the plan such
as the location and design of a transportation system or the size and
character of proposed parks and schools. Because the possible
components of a well conceived specific plan are far more numer-
ous and varied than those available in connection with traditional
forms of land use regulation the likelihood of achieving consensus
of the interests involved is greatly enhanced.
2. Resolution of Inter-Governmental Agency Conflicts in Land
Use Policy
It has only been recently that any major efforts have been made
to coordinate the land use policies of the various levels of govern-
ment.9 9 The specific plan can facilitate this coordination by pro-
viding a means by which the various affected agencies can recon-
cile their conflicts and formulate a common land use policy for the
area involved.
tion Act ("Williamson Act"), CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 51200-51295 (West Supp.
1976). See also CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 421-25 (West Supp. 1976).
99. Evidence of such increased coordination is found in the provisions
of CEQA, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000 et seq. (West Supp. 1976), which
require governmental agencies to consult with each other when making de-
cisions which might significantly affect the environment and in the in-
creased role of the State Office of Planning and Research in developing
guidelines to be used by local agencies in the preparation of certain speci-
fied elements of their General Plans.
In addition there are numerous recent proposals for land use planning
and regulatory schemes which would provide for the coordination of local
and, in some cases, regional land use policies at the state level. These in-
clude proposals or reports by, or sponsored by, the California Council of
the American Institute of Planners, the League of California Cities, Cali-
fornia Tomorrow, Inc. and the Planning and Conservation Foundation. The
California Coastal Plan, CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 27000 et seq. (West Supp.
1976), is a more formal proposal for such a scheme. See, Cal. S.B. 1579,
Cal. A.B. 3544 and Cal. A.B. 2948, 1975-76 Reg. Sess. introduced to imple-
ment the Coastal Plan. See also various bills introduced in the California
Legislature during 1970-72 regarding land use regulation in the coastal zone.
Legislation providing for such state level coordination has recently been
introduced, including Cal. A.B. 2050, 1970, Cal. A.B. 2144, 1973, Cal. A.B.
2978, 1974, Cal. A.B. 2422, 1975-76 Reg. Sess., Cal. A.B. 625, 1975-76 Reg.
Sess.
The American Law Institute has also recently adopted portions of a Model
Land Development Code which contemplates a stronger role for state agen-
cies in the development and implementation of land use policies.
See also the TASK FORCE ON NATURAL RESOURCES AND LAND USE INFORMA-
TION AND TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS 1-4. LAND USE POL-
ICY AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS (1974).
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Since the specific plan is adopted locally, the local agency is
generally not required to take into consideration the policies and
programs of other agencies. To the extent that it is willing to do
so, however, other agencies may reciprocate, enabling it to obtain
valuable consultation and commitments which will promote its own
objectives. The need for a reconciliation of local priorities with
regional and statewide interests is nowhere stronger than in the
coastal zone. In this regard, the California Coastal Plan specifical-
ly contemplates the development of "subregional plans" which
could take the form of specific plans.100
The specific plan is binding to an extent on other governmental
agencies, at least with respect to proposed capital improvements.' 0 '
In most cases it does not bind their regulatory authority. There
are, however, analogous schemes where such a binding effect is
provided. One of these is the Delaware River Basin Compact, an
interstate compact approved by Congress. 10 2 The governing com-
mission is comprised of representatives from the varous levels of
government, including the federal government. 0 3 Once the plan
promulgated by the Authority has been approved by the federal
government representative it is binding on all federal agencies. 04
A similar provision is contained in the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972 which requires federal agencies to act consistently, to
the maximum extent practicable, with a state coastal plan which
has been approved by the Secretary of Commerce. 0 5
On the state level, an effective statewide land use plan could
include state and regional commissions empowered to certify local
specific plans (participating with respect to areas and projects of
regional and state-wide concern) and give them binding effect
upon state agencies. Such a scheme might also include an expedit-
ed processing procedure for projects which are in conformity with
a certified local plan.10 6 Although the integration of local and
100. See California Coastal Plan, supra note 4 at 180-85.
101. See text accompanying notes 90-93, supra.
102. Delaware River Basin Compact, Public Law 87-238, 75 Stat. 688. For
a discussion of cooperative land use policy programs involving river basin
authorities, see Muys, Interstate Compacts and Regional Resource Planning
and Management, 4 NATIONAL RESOURCES LAWYER 153 (1973). A similar in-
teragency approach involving the federal government was initially pro-
posed with regard to regional planning for Lake Tahoe. See Comment, Re-
gional Government for Lake Tahoe, 22 HASTINGS L.J. 705 (1971).
103. Delaware River Basin Compact, supra note 102 at § 2.2.
104. Id. at § 11.1; but see § 15.1.
105. 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1451, 1456(c) (2) (West 1974).
106. The environmental impact report process might also be revised to
require an analysis of all relevant land use planning considerations, includ-
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state planning would be a major improvement in the existing
system and would be of benefit to land developers as well as to
others, it will require a considerably greater commitment to plan-
ning at the state and regional level than has heretofore existed.
3. Integration of Programs and Regulatory Schemes
The specific plan provides a mechanism which can overcome the
historic fragmentation of local land use programs (such as the
separation of zoning and regulatory schemes from capital improve-
ments programs). 1°7 While the general plan (if properly used)
could contemplate such an integration of schemes and programs, it
is framed at such a high level of abstraction that in many cases the
real basis for decision making continues to be the unstated policies
and priorities of the individual decisions makers.108
In order to overcome this type of problem in the provision and
maintenance of open space, legislation was adopted in 1970 which
expressly provided for the adoption of a specific "action program"
which would combine planning with a program for affirmative
action.10 9 The thrust of the specific plan concept is similar. It
ing social and economic, as well as environmental considerations, and to
provide comment on the consistency of the proposed action with local, re-
gional and state land use policies. If thus revised, the inefficiency and dup-
lication of information presently found in the process could be significantly
reduced.
107. See text accompanying notes 33 and 34, supra.
108. In this regard the Joint Committee on Open Space Lands, in its re-
port to the California Legislature in 1970, stated with respect to open space
that:
There is currently [1970] no requirement that local plans con-
tain a description of the program which the legislative body in-
tends to promulgage for the implementation of plan. The result
is to perpetuate the dichotomy between the plan and the control
measures which should carry it out. This in turn tends to result
in two parallel plans. One plan is the official general plan. The
other is the de facto plan drawn by the local legislative programs.
Ideally, there should be a unity between these two plans. The
first step toward the objective is to require that each open-space
plan contain an action plan program setting forth the various
means by which the planning body proposes to achieve its plan-
ning objectives. Only in this way will the various entities con-
cerned with planning matter be placed on notice of the entire
planning pattern.
California Legislature, Joint Committee on Open Space Lands, Final Report,
at 24 (February, 1970).
109. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65564 (West Supp. 1976).
also offers the opportunity for the integration of detailed regulatory
schemes which are generally passive in nature with other programs,
such as capital improvement programs, that are required in order
to implement the general policies of the local agency.
Further, zoning and other more conventional mechanisms are
relatively limited in the scope of their application as are the regula-
tory classifications which they have developed. The specific plan
is a broader approach to land use regulation, one that is free of the
narrower precedents which have restricted the usefulness of more
conventional approaches. The specific plan can more effectively
provide for a wide variety of considerations such as growth man-
agement, capital improvements, the provision of low and moderate
income housing or housing for the elderly which have generally not
been considered as part of traditional regulatory schemes such as
zoning or subdivision map approval.
4. Provision of Baseline Information
The specific plan lends itself to the comprehensive and systemat-
ic accumulation of information relating to land use policies. This
accumulated information can be used for a variety of purposes.
The plan might contain reports and studies which, when adopted,
could be a source of reference for the preparation of further
environmental impact reports and statements. Then, instead of
preparing an entirely new statement or report with respect to each
particular project, reference could be made to the reports prepared
in connection with the specific plan to the extent that they are
applicable. 110 In some cases, further reports now prepared as a
matter of course under existing guidelines might be avoided alto-
gether.
5. Avoidance of Constitutional Pitfalls
Underlying the various constitutional limitations on regulatory
authority is a concern for the reasonableness of the proposed
regulation or action in relation to the private interests to be protect-
ed. By providing a policy which is comprehensive, the specific
plan offers the opportunity to more completely accommodate the
numerous interests protected by these constitutional limitations,
110. A similar approach is being employed by San Francisco with respect
to the preparation of environmental impact statements which are required
in connection with applications for Community Development Block Grants
under the Housing and Community Development Act. See ENVIRONMENTAL
COMMENT, December, 1975 at 1.
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thus not only reducing the risk of litigation but also improving the
agency's position in the event that litigation is commenced. The
specific plan offers an opportunity for the local agency to conduct
the studies and prepare the analyses necessary to properly deter-
mine and articulate reasonableness.' 1 ' For example, a specific
zoning action judicially examined in isolation could appear arbi-
trary, discriminatory or violative of equal protection requirements.
On the other hand, if the same specific action were part of a
comprehensive scheme which recognized the concerns and interests
of private property owners as well as the public and provided for
certain trade-offs (such as tax incentives or bonus arrangements)
as an articulated attempt to equitably reconcile those concerns and
interests on a comprehensive basis, a court would be more inclined
to conclude that the regulation was reasonable and fair."12
In any event, the question of reasonableness is a factual one and
the position of a local agency is considerably stronger when it has
conducted proper studies, has made a serious effort to consider and
reconcile conflicting interests and has articulated a scheme which
deals with the various problems in a comprehensive way. The
courts have repeatedly evidenced a reluctance to replace the gov-
ernmental agency's judgment with their own when reviewing com-
plex and, in large part, political decisions on land use policy. 1
This is a sensible recognition that the adversary system of justice is
not well suited to the analysis and study of complex planning
issues.
6. Provision of a Highly Visible Focal Point For Discussion of
Public Policy Issues
Underlying all of the foregoing is the specific plan's value as a
highly visible focal point for community discussion and decision
111. See generally I. Heyman, Innovative Land Regulation and Compre-
hensive Planning, 13 SANTA CLARA L. 183 (1972).
112. For example, the court in Golden v. Planning Bd. of Town of
Ramapo, 30 N.Y.2d 359 at 373, 285 N.E.2d 291 at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 at
155 (1972), was particularly cognizant of the relationship of the capital im-
provements program to the proposed growth management scheme.
113. Being neither a super legislature nor a zoning board of appeal,
a federal court is without authority to weigh and reappraise the
factors considered or ignored by the legislative body in passing
the challenged zoning regulations.
Construction Ind. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
making with respect to land use policy issues as they relate to a
local area. Unlike the general plan, the provisions of a specific
plan are too specific to be disregarded. Unlike a single zoning
decision or subdivision approval, the aggregate effect of individual
decisions is apparent. This concept of a highly visible policy and
decision making process is an integral component of the democrat-
ic process even though it is understandably difficult to achieve in a
diverse and complex society.1 14
C. Problems and Issues
While existing specific plan legislation offers great promise as a
mechanism for reconciling land use conflicts, its future application
and use will to some extent be affected by the resolution or
clarification of certain problems and issues. A few of the more
apparent problems are discussed below.
1. Constitutional Limitations
As, discussed above, the specific plan concept can assist local
governments in obtaining their proper objectives in a constitution-
ally acceptable manner. 115 Nevertheless, the constitutional princi-
ples of just compensation, due process, equal protection and the
right to travel will continue to be raised with respect to innovative
regulatory schemes such as the specific plan." 6  Because the ena-
bling legislation is broadly drawn and there is little by way of
custom or judicial precedent to define the limits of permissible use,
the specific plan may carry with it a potential for controversy and
litigation both as to the interpretation of its legislation as well as to
the applicability of constitutional principles.
2. Relationship to Other Planning and Regulatory Schemes
The relationship of the specific plan to the general plan and
other forms of land use regulatory schemes such as zoning and
subdivision ordinances is still largely undetermined. Was the leg-
islation creating the specific plan intended as an entirely separate
114. For an interesting discussion of the role of a visible policy in group
decision making processes, see L. HALPRIN, THE RSVP CYCLES: CREATIVE
PROCESSES IN THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1969).
115. See text accompanying notes 111-13 supra.
116. Users of the specific plan will need to be aware of at least three
areas where major constitutional principles are still largely undefined: (i)
point at which regulation become a "taking"; (ii) how specific may specific
planning become before.notice and a hearing must be afforded to affected
landowners; and (iii) the standard of judicial review applicable to the im-
plementation and/or amendment of specific plans.
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grant of authority? To what extent is it bound by the limitations
and provisions of more traditional schemes? May a specific plan,
for example, require an industrial development to dedicate lands
for public purposes when the Subdivision Map Act expressly ex-
cludes industrial subdivisions from the provisions enabling a local
agency to require such dedication as a condition to final map
approval? 117 Consideration should be given to the adoption of
additional legislation to clarify these questions.
3. Provision of Assurances
One of the most interesting problems relating to the effective use
of the specific plan concept is the means by which assurances can
be provided to private landowners as well as to other governmental
agencies that the policies set forth in an adopted specific plan will
actually be implemented. Such assurances are not only valuable in
obtaining the cooperation of interested parties, but may enhance
the local agency's ability to withstand challenges in the courts. In
Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo,118 for example, the
court noted with apparent approval that the regulatory schemes
providing for phased development were matched with a capital
improvements program to assure that the restricted lands could be
developed after a specified period of time.119 Of course, even the
provision of a capital improvements program does not assure fu-
ture development and there remains the question of what remedies
might be available to a landowner in the event that the improve-
ments are not completed within the time specified. While such a
failure to proceed with a specified capital improvements program
might be the basis for judicial relief from the restrictions, this
remedy is far less effective than that normally available to enforce
contractual undertakings and may be time consuming and costly to
enforce. Where the consent of landowners to a specific plan has
been secured by means of a compromise embodying such a pro-
gram, this problem is obviously even more significant.
Under certain circumstances, a specific plan might include or
contemplate contractual undertakings. Although there are sub-
117. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66477 (West Supp. 1976).
118. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
119. Id. at 373, 285 N.E.2d at 304, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 155.
stantial restrictions on the authority of a local agency to limit its
police powers by contract, 120 recent court decisions have hinted at
doctrines which might be used to provide a greater degree of
commitment on the part of local government in certain circum-
stances.
One such doctrine is estoppel. Although the courts have histori-
cally been reluctant to extend the doctrine of estoppel to govern-
ment,1 2 1 it is still clear that, at least in some circumstances, it may
be applicable. 1 22 To successfully assert this doctrine the injured
party would have to show that (1) the local government had
represented certain facts, (2) that such representations were in-
tended to induce its reliance, and (3) that it justifiedly relied upon
the representations to its injury.1 2 ' The main obstacle in using
estoppel to bind a local government seeking to renege on promises
made is the strong public policy against allowing government to
contract away its police power so as to, render it unable to respond
to a change of circumstances or policy.
2 4
Another approach to the problem would be to require that the
local government sustain the burden of proof in demonstrating the
need for a change in the plan, taking into consideration, among
other things, the nature of the commitments contained therein.
This approach would recognize the plan as one embodying and
reconciling numerous complex and conflicting interests and there-
fore one deserving preservation and enforcement of the compro-
mise contained therein absent a compelling need to depart from it.
Under some circumstances a prerequisite to allowing a change
would be the compensation of injured parties. Such an approach
would protect the interests of the local government in maintaining
flexibility as well as the interests of landowners and others who
have relied on existing plans.
A not dissimilar approach was applied by the Oregon Supreme
Court in Fasano v. Board of County Commissioners. In that case
120. See County of San Diego v. California Water and Telephone Co.,
30 Cal. 2d 817, 824, 186 P.2d 124, 129 (1947).
121. Id. at 825-27, 186 P.2d at 129-31. See also D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON
& C. MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE §§ 5.28-5.52 (1969).
122. City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 3 Cal.3d 462, 493, 476 P.2d 423, 445,
91 Cal. Rptr. 23, 45-46 (1970). Cf. Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 15 Cal.
3d 720, 543 P.2d 264, 125 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1975).
123. Driscoll v. City of Los Angeles, 67 Cal. 2d 297, 305, 431 P.2d 245,
250, 61 Cal. Rptr. 661, 666 (1967).
124. See People ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Works v. Ryan Outdoor Advertising,
Inc., 39 Cal. App. 3d 804, 812,-13, 114 Cal. Rptr. 499, 504-05 (1974);
Kappadahl v. Alcan Pacific Co., 222 Cal. App. 2d 626, 633, 35 Cal. Rptr.
354, 358-59 (1963).
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certain zoning amendments were treated as "quasi-judicial" in
nature and the proponents of the amendments were held to have
the burden of justification.125 A careful planner could lay the
groundwork for this type of judicial review by including within the
adopted specific plan a carefully articulated statement of the facts
upon which the plan is based, the assurances sought, the manner in
which interested parties are relying thereon and any anticipated
detriment that might be suffered as a part of the compromise
incorporated within the plan.
Recent proposals for the certification of local plans by regional
or state agencies might also provide a measure of protection against
unjustified changes by requiring that the local agency justify its
need for the change and by giving opposing parties the opportunity
to object.
It is clear that to more fully obtain and reflect the compromises
which may be required in an effective specific plan the local agency
must have an ability to provide a high degree of commitment.
Accordingly, methods for achieving this such as those discussed
above should be considered further.
4. Local Boundary Limitations
A significant limitation on the specific plan concept is that it is
primarily a local regulatory mechanism. While under current
legislation adjoining jurisdictions may act together to produce a
regional plan,'126 such plans are general in scope and advisory
only.'2 7  The increasing need for greater coordination of local
planning with regional, state and national interests would seem to
justify the passage of enabling legislation to provide for the adop-
tion of specific plans comprising areas in more than one jurisdic-
tion and binding governmental agencies on the various levels. Such
legislation would permit plans to be formulated for areas defined
by geographic and demographic as well as by political bounda-
ries.128
125. 264 Ore. 574 at 579, 507 P.2d 23 at 28 (1973).
126. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65060 et seq. (West 1966). See also Joint Powers
Act, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65000 et seq. (West 1966) providing for joint power
agreements.
127. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65060.8 (West 1966).
128. Some cities and counties in California have already sought a greater
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Traditional land use planning and regulatory institutions have
proven inadequate to deal effectively with the problem of excessive
urbanization in California. The need for developing new ap-
proaches for solving this problem has been recognized on all levels
of government. We are now experiencing a period of experimen-
tation, but many of the innovations being developed are fragmen-
tary and inconsistent when viewed from a regional, state and
national perspective, inefficient in terms of the cost of their appli-
cation, inequitable and perhaps inconsistent with some of the basic
principles of this society.
There is no greater priority facing planners and land use attor-
neys than the development of mechanisms and tools which permit
government to effectively deal with problems of excessive urbaniza-
tion and which provide for the equitable reconciliation of conflict-
ing private, local, regional and statewide interests. In this regard
there is wisdom in recognizing local government as the focal point
for the development of area-wide land use policies while at the
same time requiring consistency with regional, statewide and na-
tionwide interests.
The specific plan concept offers local government a means of
taking the initiative in developing comprehensive land use policies
which combine regulation with action programs. The specific
plan concept also offers a process whereby an effective and defini-
tive policy can be developed in a highly visible manner which both
recognizes and reconciles the diverse interests which are affected
thereby. In this way the specific plan promises to be an effective
mechanism for resolving land use conflicts within our society in a
manner which will improve the quality of life available to the
people of this state.
degree of coordination and integration in their land use policies by means
of joint power agreements. One example is the proposed "Richardson Bay-
Southern Marin Development Review Area" in which the cities of Belve-
dere, Mill Valley, Sausalito and Tiburon have agreed with Marin County
to establish a joint residential development in the review board with the
power to pass on applications for residential development in the review
area. See MARIN COUNTY, CALIF. CODE ch. 22.96 (pertaining to residential
development review, added by Ordinance No. 2158).
